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Simulating Party Competition and Vote Decision under
Mixed Member Electoral Systems
Susumu Shikano∗
Abstract This paper proposes an interactive mechanism between both tiers of mixed-member
electoral systems to explain high-level linkage in West Germany, that is, the dominance of dis-
trict races by the candidates of the two largest parties at the national level. The distinctive feature
of the model lies in interactive effects in terms of expectation formation. That is, voters under
mixed systems are assumed to utilize national-level PR results to form expectations which, in
turn, are used to vote strategically in the plurality tier. To sort out the independent effect of these
kinds of interactions, this paper develops a computational model and examines its simulation
results.
Keywords Agent-based modelling, mixed-member electoral systems, strategic voting
JEL classiﬁcation D72 ∗
1. Linkage in the West German party system
There are some simple facts which are obvious to those within Germany, but are largely
ignored by people outside it. Such a fact is that all of West Germany’s single member
districts (SMD) elected using plurality, which makes up one half of the members of the
German federal parliament (Bundestag), are won by either the CDU/CSU (Christian
Democrats) or the SPD (Social Democrats). No district has been won by another party
since 1961. This becomes more remarkable if one observes not only gained seats, but
also competitions for the seats. The solid line in Figure 1 shows the percentage of West
German districts where candidates of both large parties ranked ﬁrst and second. Ac-
cordingly, at the ﬁrst general election 1949 only cca 60 % of districts were contested
between the candidates of CDU/CSU and SPD. Thereafter, this percentage increased
rapidly. Since 1965, all districts in West Germany have been dominated by the can-
didates of both large parties without any exceptions. To compare this with England,
while in the 1950’s almost all English districts were competed between the candidates
of the Labour and the Conservative, the share of such districts has never reached 100%.
It even decreased in the course of time and sank under 50% in the 1980’s. That is, in
more than half of the districts, the top two candidates were either {Conservative, one
small party} or {Labour, one small party} or {one small party, another small party}.
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Note: West Berlin is not accounted in West Germany.
Figure 1. Percentage of districts which are competed between the two main parties at national
level in West Germany and England
The results above demonstrate that the district races in Germany are more uni-
formly dominated by the two largest national parties than the ones in England. This
should appear counter-intuitive in the eyes of most political scientists. Students in
the discipline learn in their introductory course on comparative politics that there are
two archetypes of democracy: majoritarian and consensual democracy. According to
the celebrated work of Lijphart (1999), the majoritarian democracy is characterized
by two competing large parties which alternately control governmental power. In the
consensus democracy, by contrast, more parties are visible and coalition government
is common. Lijphart takes the Westminster-Model of England as the epitome of the
former type of democracy and (West) Germany for the latter consensual type. The
ﬁndings above are, however, not in line with the classiﬁcation since election results in
West Germany show a more typical pattern of bipartism than England.
The goal of this paper is to give an answer to the anomaly discussed above. My
supposition is that the answer can be found in the co-existence of plurality- and PR-rule
under the West German electoral system, which more recently has been referred to as
a “mixed-member electoral system” or simply “mixed system” (Shugart 2001). Here, I
speculate that the visibility of the PR tier facilitates the uniform dominance of the two
large national parties and suppresses local district races deviating from the national
one. The visibility of the two large national parties also boosts the advantage of their
candidates so that they enjoy a signiﬁcantly large margin over other candidates. The
trend toward this dualism in district races, in turn, contributes to an increasing visibility
ofthelargetwopartiesinthePRtier. Thisfurtherampliﬁes thedualismofdistrictraces
though the mechanism above. This spiral of dualism leads to a stable dominance of
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two large parties in plurality as well as in the PR tier which we have observed in West
German election results.
This uniformity of district races has been studied as linkage by multiple scholars in
connection with Duverger’s Law (for example Cox 1997). Duverger’s Law forecasts
bipartism under simple plurality rule based on the wasted-vote logic. However, this
wasted-vote logic can work only at the district level. Assuming N single-member
districts, two candidates can gain signiﬁcant amounts of votes in each of N districts,
while these 2N candidates do not necessarily belong to one of the two main parties at
the national level. As a result, up to 2N parties can gain signiﬁcant amounts of votes.
To establish bipartism at the national level, in contrast, the 2N candidates should be
linked with each other into two large national-level parties. This process is called
linkage and its perfect form has been observed in the uniformity in West Germany
district races. Whereas the linkage process under plurality system has been studied by
multiple scholars, there are few studies about this process under mixed systems. This
paper aims to off set this research deﬁcit.1
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: the next section introduces a
model with interactive mechanism of mixed system. The third section gives the results
of simulated data. The last fourth section closes this paper with some discussions on
this paper’s results.
2. Set-ups of computational model
This section introduces the model to be simulated below. The distinctive feature of
the model is that it incorporates diverse kinds of interactive effects between two ballots
under mixed systems. While one such interactive effect was investigated as contamina-
tion by Ferrara, Herron and Nishikawa (2005) extensively, this paper’s model accounts
for further kinds of interactive effects. Among them, interactive effects in expectation
formation are most important for this paper’s conjecture: national-level bipartism un-
der mixed systems. More concretely, the use of national-level results in the PR tier
in expectation formation in the plurality tier operates in favor of candidates belonging
to the largest national parties and to the disadvantage of candidates of regional parties
(for a less formal introduction of the model and its assumptions see Shikano 2007,
Chapter 4).
More speciﬁcally, the simulation model developed here is an extension of Laver
(2005). Laver’s model can be summarized as follows: ﬁrst, a two-dimensional ideolo-
gical space is set up in which the ideal point of voters are normally distributed. Second,
parties are also assigned to a certain ideological position in the same ideological space.
Third, voters evaluate their distance to each party and cast their ballots for the nearest
party. Fourth, cast votes are counted and the results of each party are announced. Fifth,
being confronted with the election result, each party adapts their own ideological po-
sition. There are four strategies according to which each party adapt their positions:
Hunter, Aggregator, Predator and Sticker. All of the strategies are adaptive, that is, they
1 This paper’s measure of linkage is different from those in conventional studies. For more details see
Shikano (2007, Chapter 2).
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Set-up
Create 30 districts with two-dimensional ideological space
Create 400 voters in each district varying their distribution form over districts
(Homogeneity of voter distribution is set by a parameter.)
Create K parties with one of four strategies
Create K candidates for K parties in each district
Voters’action (PR)
- Evaluate the distance to each party
- Vote for the closest party
Voters’action (SMD)
- Evaluate the distance to
each candidate
- Form an expectation
about the election outcome
- Vote for the candidate
with the maximal expected utility
Updating PR Result
- Count the votes for each party
Updating SMD Results
- Count the votes
for each candidate in each district
- Investigate the winner
in each district
- Sum up the gained seats
of each party
Parties’action
- Evaluate the electon outcome
of PR
-Adapt their own policy-position
Candidates’action
- Evaluate the electon outcome
in the district
-Adapt their own policy-position
One cycle
Note: See also the overview of Laver (2005, Figure 2) for the differences from his simulation model.
Figure 2. Overview of the simulation model
need only limited information of party competition. Some of them are results-oriented
or vote-maximizing and others are rather policy-oriented.2 Repeating the third, fourth
and ﬁfth step, Laver observes the consequences of various combinations of the party
strategies.
I chose Laver’s model for the following reasons: ﬁrst, the setting of simulation is
relatively simple. For example, the ideological space is two-dimensional. It is simple;
however, it also corresponds to the ideological space which is assumed for various
political systems by many political scientists and the other kinds of experts. Second,
there is a variety of party strategies whereby some parties are more oriented at the
election result and the other more at policy. This is one of the features which are not
feasible in conventional analytical models, but in computational models. Third, all
2 Each of the strategies is described more in detail later in this section.
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strategies are not optimizing, but adaptive. That is, parties have to adapt their position
using only limited information concerning the election results and the position of other
parties. In other computational models parties often possesses much more information,
in particular prospective information, for example possible results in a hypothetical
move in future. If one considers actor’s bounded capacity of information processing,
however, it is rather unrealistic to assume that political actors can take such kinds
of strategy. Fourth, Laver’s model does not aim to ﬁnd equilibrium, but to describe
complex and dynamic processes of party competition. This is also the aim of the
current paper as discussed above.
Figure 2 gives the overview of the model. I extended Laver’s model in following
four points: First, Laver models party competitions under the pure proportional repre-
sentation (PR)-system. The present paper, in contrast, is interested in the party com-
petition and voting behavior under mixed systems. Correspondingly, I also model the
party competition under plurality in single-member districts. Second, aside from just
the party, the model here also incorporates the behavior of individual district candi-
dates who can take a deviating policy-position from that of their own parties. The third
extension concerns the action of voters. Voters in Laver’s model always vote sincerely,
i.e. for the closest party in the ideological space. This is, however, less plausible if one
models voter decision under the plurality system. Under this system, as we have seen
above, voters can strategically cast their vote for the second best candidate to maxi-
mize their expected utility (for example Cox 1997). Therefore, not only the proximity
to parties, but also the expectation of the election’s outcome in plurality races is also
incorporated here. Fourth, the model of the present paper suggests the existence of
some interactive effects in casting plurality- and PR-ballots. To observe which kind
of consequences the interactive effects have, the model is also extended in this regard
(dotted arrows in Figure).3
2.1 Ideological space and voter distribution
Voters in the model are assumed to be oriented by the policy outcome which is repre-
sented as position in a two-dimensional ideological space R×R. Voter i’s ideal point
is represented as:
zi = (zi1,zi2) ∈ R×R (1)
While the number of dimensions (two) is chosen arbitrarily, the number of dimen-
sions is less relevant here. This is because the number of dimensions is equivalent to
heterogeneity of voter distributions in different districts. As discussed below, the he-
terogeneity is parameterized in the computational model and simulates different kinds
of dimensionality.
Each dimension has a length of 100 in the sense that a single dimension contains
100 possible ideological positions for voters, parties and candidates. Since the space is
two-dimensional, there are 10,000 (= 100×100) possible positions. In this sense, the
3 The model introduced below was programmed using Repast. Repast (Recursive Porus Agent Simulation
Toolkit) is a broadly used, free and open-source Java-based toolkit for agent-based modeling and further
simulation techniques. The simulation program introduced here is available from the author upon request.
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ideological space is not continuous, but discrete. Each discrete position in the space
can be occupied by multiple actors.
In the same ideological space, political parties and their candidates compete for the
vote and seat with following positions:
wj = (wj1,wj2) ∈ R×R (2)
w0
j = (wj01,wj02) ∈ R×R (3)
One important difference from that of Laver (2005) is that this paper’s model also
accounts for the plurality race in each SMD. Therefore, while Laver’s model has only
one district at national level the model of this paper sets up 30 single member districts
with 400 voters each. All districts share the same two-dimensional ideological space.
Voters are distributed in a limited space as deﬁned above. To simulate different
voter distributions in the limited ideological space, the Beta distribution is appropriate.
This distribution can take a diverse ﬂexible form on a limited scale.
The shape of a beta distribution is determined by two parameters a and b. Cor-




Ik is the set of voters who cast their votes in district k.
If ak and bk are homogeneous over K districts, each district’s voter distribution
should be similar to each other since they are drawn from a similar distribution. In
contrast, heterogeneity of ak and bk leads to heterogeneous voter distributions. To
parameterize this, ak and bk are also drawn from another beta distribution B(10h,10h):
ak ∼ B(10h,10h)×5+2 (∈ [2,7])
bk ∼ B(10h,10h)×5+2 (∈ [2,7])
The parameter h ∈ [−2,2] controls the homogeneity/heterogeneity of drawn ak and
bk. To see this, one has to know further characteristics of the beta distribution. First,
if both parameters are the same, the shape of the corresponding beta distribution is
symmetric. Therefore, B(10h,10h) results in symmetrical distributions. Second, the
larger the parameter values the more density around the middle of distribution. If both
parameter values equal one, the beta distribution is the uniform distribution. This is
realized by h = 0 since 100 = 1. If both parameter values are less than one, the beta
distribution is bimodal at both extreme values. This is the case if h < 0.
To summarize, the higher the assigned value of h is, the more similar the form of
voter distribution in each district. For example, the distributions generated with a high
homogeneity (h = 1) show all symmetrical and normal distributions which are similar
to each other. In contrast, some of the distributions generated with a low homogeneity
(h = −1) show skewed distributions in various directions and the other show sym-
metrical distributions. Among symmetrical distributions, however, some have a larger
variance than the other.
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2.2 Voters’ actions
2.2.1 Utility and vote choice
Voters cast their ballot according to their proximity to the party/candidate. More for-
mally, voter i’s utility of party j is speciﬁed as the negative of the squared distance
between the ideal point of i and that of j:
Ui(j) = −(wj −zi)2 (4)
The negative sign is used since utility declines with increasing distance. Voters
decide deterministically according to the utility deﬁned above. That it, they vote for a
party whose utility is the highest among all parties. If there is a tie at the highest utility
the voter decides randomly among the parties with the highest utility.
If a non-zero value is set as weight of the actual election result in the computing
expectation, voters form expectations on the outcome of district race and cast their
ballot based on their expected utility. In this case, they can strategically vote for a
candidate whose ideological position is not next to their own positions. The details
will be given in the next section.
In the standard literature about strategic voting with single vote, expected utility is




where pjj0 is the expectation that the race is so close that a vote for a candidate j
inﬂuences the election results. Accordingly, pjj0 = 1 when candidate j ties with an-
other candidate j0 in the same district or is one vote behind her. Otherwise, a vote for
candidate j has no impact on the election result, so that pjj0 = 0.
In the spirit of adaptive actors, the simulation relaxes the assumptions based on
the concept of the strict rationality. Accordingly, voters do not compare all pairs of
candidates in the same district. Instead, they compare solely the incumbent denoted
as 0 and the other candidates. The “adaptive” expected utility of a non-incumbent
candidate j looks like the following:
AEUi(j) = pj(Ui(j)−Ui(0)) (6)
The expected utility of incumbent is thus set to zero.
2.2.2 Expectation formation
It is tricky to endogenize the formation of expectation as subjective probability. We
cannot take the approach of Savage (1954) who suggests to infer the subjective proba-
bility of a person using her material behavior. This “revealed expectation” approach
is not feasible in this context since we do not have to deal with real data and we are
going to “generate” behavior based on utility and expectation deﬁned as a priori. Al-
ternatively, we generate expectation from past experience of voters. In this regards, it
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is well known that the margin between the winner and the ﬁrst loser at the last elec-
tion predicts well the percentage of strategic voting, i.e., the smaller the margin, the
more strategic voting occurs (for example Black 1978, 1980; Cain 1978; Cox 1997).
Accordingly, we can assume that the last vote difference between the incumbent and
candidate j0 is used by voters in forming their subjective probability at election t.
pj0t = f(dj0t−1) (7)
dj0t−1 = e00t−1−ej0t−1, (8)
where e00t−1 and ej0t−1 are the percentage of received votes of the incumbent and can-
didate j0 respectively.
There still remains a problem of the form of f, i.e. how can we relate a past experi-
ence in the scale of vote margin with a subjective probability. Conventional analytical
studies would assume the multi-nomial distribution. This paper, however, does not
utilize this kind of relationship based on the multi-nomial distribution. As stated re-
peatedly above, voters in this paper are assumed to be limited in their capacity of infor-
mation processing and only adaptively rational. The use of multi-nomial distribution
is not consistent with this assumption.
Alternatively, Black (1978) proposes a simple linear relationship:
pj0t = 1−dj0t−1 (9)
This function form, however, seems to be too simple to model the relationship
between the vote margin and the subjective probability. Imagine following two cases:
the vote margin of candidate A increases from 2% to 10% while candidate B’s vote
difference to the incumbent shifts from 72% to 80%. Intuitively, we would say that the
subjective probability that A ends in a tie at the ﬁrst place drops more drastically than
that of B. According to (9), however, voters’ expectation for both candidates drops by
the same amount (8 percentage points). The function form of (9) does not correspond
to our intuition saying that the marginal expectation also depends on the vote margin.





This function possesses some advantages. If dj0t−1 = 0 then pj0t = 1. And pj0t is
monotonically decreasing along dj0t−1. In addition, this function has only one para-
meter which makes it easier to estimate in the simulation process and also to interpret
results. Furthermore, pj0t stays in the interval of [0,1].






It is obviously tautological to estimate at from a vote margin of t −1 and expecta-
tion at t since our goal is to estimate pj0t using at. If we, however, see the situation as
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a repeated game and voters develop subjective expectation adaptively we can assume
that the parameter a can be approximated through its past parameter value:




We still need the real probability that the race is close at t −1, pj0t−1. While the
objective probability that a voter is pivotal is de facto zero for a large electorate, we
also relax this assumption. Instead of the one vote behind, we assume that the voter
would recognize the impact of his vote as 95% if the vote share of candidate j0 is
within the 90% conﬁdence interval of incumbent’s (v0). Otherwise, the level of impact














By putting this e pj0t−1 ∈ {0.01,0.95} and vote margin of individual candidates at
t −2 into (12), aj0t−1 can be computed for individual non-incumbent candidates. For
general parameter for all candidates, I take the average of individual parameters:
at−1 = aj0t−1 (14)
By putting this value as an approximate of at into (10), the adaptively approximated
value of pj0t can be obtained.
2.2.3 Interactive effects between ballots
The important feature of the current paper’s model is interactive effects between two
decision processes, that is, casting vote in the plurality and the PR tier. As discussed
above, the model assumes three kinds of interactive effects:
(i) Preference formation (controlled by the parameter l1)
(ii) Decision making (controlled by the parameter l2)
(iii) Expectation formation (controlled by the parameter l3)
Interactive effects in preference formation between both tiers are incorporated via
a perceived position of each party/candidate. If information from the PR tier is utilized
by voters in building preference, one can assume that the perceived ideological posi-
tion of a candidate is determined also by the position of the candidate’s party, and vice
versa. The degree and direction of interactive effects is parameterized via a weighting
parameter, l1, which can take a value between −1 and 1. A positive value of l1 means
4 Note that the values 95% and 1% for p and 90% for the conﬁdence interval have nothing to do with each
other. The value chosen here was found in some trial-and-error processes. If one takes a larger conﬁdence
interval, the situation in which a voter is pivot takes place more frequently. Correspondingly, estimated value
for a tends to be smaller. The choice of likelihood value (here 95% and 1%) also inﬂuence estimation of a.
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that the PR tier inﬂuences the plurality tier; a negative value means the reversed direc-
tion of inﬂuence. The absolute value of l1 corresponds to the weight of information
from the inﬂuencing tier.




−(wj −zi)2 if l1 ≥ 0
−|l1|(wj0 −zi)2−(1−|l1|)(wj −zi)2 if l1 < 0
(15)
Analogously, voter i’s utility of candidate j0 is calculated as follows:
Ui(j0) =
￿
Ui(j0) = −(1−l1)(wj0 −zi)2−l1(wj −zi)2 if l1 > 0
Ui(j0) = −(wj0 −zi)2 if l1 ≤ 0
(16)
Note that if l1 = 0 this kind of interactive effects does not operate between both tiers.
Interactive effects in vote decision are modeled in a similar way to those in pre-
ference buildings. Interactive effects are parameterized via l2 ∈ [−1;1]. Like l1, a
positive value of l2 means an inﬂuence of vote decision in the PR tier upon that in the
plurality tier; a negative value means the direction of inﬂuence is reversed. While the
absolute value of l2 also corresponds to the degree of inﬂuence (which differs from
the perceived ideological distance), vote decision cannot be modeled as a weighted
mean. Instead, interactive effects in vote decision are modeled in a probabilistic way.
Assuming that voter i would decide for party G and district candidate S0 according to
(expected) utility deﬁned above. Denote the candidate of party G in the district of voter
i G0 and candidate S0’s party S. Then:
Prob(i votes for G) = 1
Prob(i votes for G0) = l2




if l2 ≥ 0 (17)
Prob(i votes for G)0 = 1−|l2|
Prob(i votes for S) = |l2|




if l2 < 0 (18)
Note that l2 = 0 also means no interactive effects between both tiers.5
Unlike the other two kinds of interactive effects, those in expectation formation
have only one direction. That is, information from the PR tier is used in the plurality
tier while the reversed ﬂow of information is not modeled. This is because in the vote
decision process in the PR tier expectation plays no role as deﬁned above. Correspond-
ingly, the parameter l3 for this kind of interactive effects takes only a value between 0
and 1. Like l1, the value corresponds to the weight of inﬂuencing information from the
PR tier. As deﬁned above, expectation is formed based on the vote margin at the last
election, dj0t−1 (see p. 277). Therefore, if l3 > 0, not only candidate j0’s vote margin
but also that of her party j is considered using following equation:
dj0t−1 = (1−l3)(e00t−1−ej0t−1)+l3(e0t−1−ejt−1) (19)
5 Concretely in the program, a random number is generated from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 for
each voter and compared with |l2|.
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2.3 Parties’/ candidates’ actions
As discussed above, the model also incorporates the (strategic) behavior of political
elites. Following Laver (2005), four types of parties are generated: Hunter, Predator,
Aggregator and Sticker.
Hunter is oriented toward the support for itself. If the support increased after a
move, Hunter makes the same move again. Otherwise, Hunter randomly selects a move
in an opposite direction of the last move. This behavior can be formally expressed:










if vjt−1 ≤ vjt−2, (21)
where vjt is the votes which party j gains at election t, and m is the maximal distance
of a move on a dimension in a single cycle. This is set as 2 throughout the following
simulation runs.
Predator observes only the position of the most successful party and moves toward
it. If the party itself is the largest party, it does not change its position. Formally:
Dwjt =
￿
m·sign(w0t−1−wjt−1) if maxj06=jvj0t−1 > vjt−1
0 if maxj06=jvj0t−1 ≤ vjt−1, (22)
where w0t is the position of the largest parties at election t.
Aggregator cares about the distribution of the ideal position of his supporters and
moves to their average position. Formally:
wjt = zi for i : vit−1 = j, (23)
where vit is voter i’s decision at election t.
Sticker never changes its position in the ideological space. Accordingly:
Dwjt = 0 (24)
The choice of these four party types of Laver is justiﬁed by the following reasons:
ﬁrst, every type of parties behaves based on limited information which makes the si-
mulation more realistic. Second, Hunter and Predator prevent reaching an equilibrium
which has never existed at real elections. Furthermore, the ﬁrst two parties can be clas-
siﬁed as competition oriented or vote maximizing parties while the other two parties
are policy-driven. This enables one to test the hypothesis if these two kinds of mo-
tivations affect the linkage. The number of each type of parties is randomly selected
from {0,1,2,3}. This can generate a party system with minimum zero and maximum
12 parties. Since a party competition with less than two parties is not relevant and
simulations with too many parties are time-consuming, the total number of parties is
limited between 3 and 8.
Differently from Laver (2005), not only political parties but also district candidates
compete against each other in 30 districts. In this regard, candidates for each party
are generated in each district and take the strategy of their afﬁliated party. Therefore,
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the combination of strategies in each district is identical to that of the national party
competition. Each party and its candidates are assigned to a randomly selected starting
point in the ideological space. Once a simulation starts, however, candidate positions
can deviate from their afﬁliated party. Each district candidate — except for those with
the Sticker-strategy — takes position in reaction to its district speciﬁc circumstance. Its
positioning can, however, also be inﬂuenced by the PR tier via different kinds of inter-
active effects in vote decision process. If election results also depend on the positioning
of political parties due to interactive effects, candidates have to react correspondingly.
Each candidate moves in each cycle while each party moves in every tenth cycles. This
is based on the assumption that district candidates can change their position easier than
political parties as collective actors.
2.4 Collecting data
The model of this paper contains a large set of parameters. Since it would take a
long time to investigate every point in such a high-dimensional parameter space, 1,000
simulation runs are conducted with randomly drawn parameters. The possible value
for each parameter is summarized in the following:
(i) Homogeneity h ∈ {−2,−1,0,1,2}
(ii) No. of strategies ∈ {0,1,2,3}, whereby the total no. of parties ∈ {3,4,5,6,7,8}
(iii) Actualizing expectation ∈ {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1}
(iv) Interactive effects in preference building l1 ∈ {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1}
(v) Interactive effects in vote choice l2 ∈ {−1,−0.75,−0.5,...,1}
(vi) Interactive effects in expectation formation l3 ∈ {−1,−0.75,−0.5,...,1}
As mentioned above, the starting positions of parties and candidates are randomly
set in the ideological space. Also voter positions are randomly determined according
to the homogeneity above.
A single simulation run longs for 500 cycles. That is, voters cast their ballot 500
times. Of 500 cycles in each simulation, the ﬁrst 300 cycles are discarded as so-called
burn-in since cycles in earlier phases are strongly conditioned by the starting values.6
Furthermore, voters as well as candidates/parties need some cycles to learn adaptively
to follow their strategies. After this burn-in, that is, after the results are more or less
independent of the initial condition, each 5 of 200 cycles are collected. This is because,
if one collects data from all cycles, each data point is not independent of each other.
That is, the data set suffers a time-series problem which would make the statistical
inference more complicated. Consequently, 40 data points are collected for a single
simulation run. This is repeated 1,000 times which generate 40,000 data points.
The data collected in this way are suited to the conventional statistical techniques
since the frequentist view postulates that the analyzed data are only one realization of
inﬁnitely repeatable data collection processes. This is, however, hardly realistic for
6 Pilot simulation runs show that the results obtained between 300 and 500 cycles have no clear deviation
from those in further cycles.
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the data collected in conventional methods. The simulation technique is one of a few
methods compatible with the frequentist assumption above. Furthermore, there is no
risk of multi-collinearity in multivariate analysis since the random draws of parame-
ters were conducted independently of each other and there is no correlation between
parameters.
3. Evaluation of simulation results
In this section, I draw implications from the computational model which was set up
above. The model is not analytically solved, but it generates data via multiple simula-
tion runs from which implications are drawn. After the relationships are described in
a bivariate manner, the second subsection analyzes the factor of high-level linkage by
using multivariate statistical models.
3.1 Bivariate observation of results
3.1.1 Linkage under simple plurality rule
Before we observe the simulation results under mixed-member electoral systems, those
under simple plurality rule are described as a benchmark. For this purpose, 500 simu-
lation runs were conducted with the following parameters ﬁxed to 0:
(i) Interactive effects concerning perceived distance (l1)
(ii) Interactive effects in vote decision (l2)
(iii) Interactive effects in expectation formation (l3)
By setting these parameters to 0, we can obtain simulation results of party compe-
titions and vote decisions which independently take place in plurality and PR.
Figure 3 presents the frequency of dominated districts under different parameter
conditions. An interesting result is that districts’ homogeneity concerning voter dis-
tributions has no clear-cut effect on the level of linkage. In the line of arguments of
classical political sociology, the number of cleavage in the society should positively
inﬂuence the number of parties. Accordingly, the more cleavages exist in a society, the
more heterogeneous voters’ preference proﬁles are across districts. This should lead to
success of some regional parties in certain districts, which contributes to a multi-party
system at the national level. Consistent with this expectation, increasing homogeneity
ofvoterdistributionstendstoshowahigherleveloflinkage(moredominateddistricts);
however, its magnitude of impact is somewhat moderate.
In contrast, the number of parties demonstrates more clear-cut effect upon the level
of linkage. The more the parties are in the race, the lower the level of linkage. One
might argue that it is self-evident that in a party competition with fewer parties, it
is more likely that a same set of two parties compete in more districts. However,
the degree of the impact is still clear if one compares with simulated frequencies of
dominant districts where election results are randomly generated.7 This is primarily
due to the party/candidate strategies.
7 This result is available from the author upon request.



















































































































Figure 3. Frequency of dominated districts in plurality
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As introduced in the set-up of the computational model, all candidates of a same
party share the same type of strategy. Each strategy is different in its successfulness
in the party competition. Therefore, if candidates of a part of parties take a success-
ful strategy they can be successful across the districts. This leads to a higher level of
linkage. This can be supported partly by the result that the presence of one Hunter, Ag-
gregator or Sticker leads to higher-level linkage than the absence of the same strategy.
An increasing number of Hunters, Predators and Aggregators lead to a decreasing level
of linkage. This is conceivable since votes gained by two or more candidates with a
same strategy should be similar so that it can differ among districts which candidates
rank ﬁrst and second. As a result, the level of linkage should be lowered.
Interestingly, this does not hold for Stickers. That is, the increasing number of
Stickers raises the level of linkage. There are two reasons for this. First, Sticker is
the least successful strategy. Therefore, the increase in their number has a less direct
impact on the level of linkage since they have less chance to be one of the two largest
parties at the national level. However, the increasing number of Stickers also means
that the decreasing number of other strategies, and in particular, the decreasing proba-
bility that two candidates with the same successful strategy compete with each other.
Due to this, the level of linkage can rise. Second — and this is less likely — if Stick-
ers are in the two main parties at the national level, the level of linkage can also be
high. Since the position of candidates with Sticker-strategy is fully identical across the
districts, the candidates from the same party are likely to be consistently successful.
Whereas the level of linkage can be attributed to the number of competing parties,
the use of expected utility seems to have no clear impact upon linkage (the lower-right
panel of Figure 3 shows). Therefore, we can conclude that the strategic voting based
on the expected utility model can have no consequence for the linkage process under
a simple plurality system. This can be different under mixed systems. To see this,
we observe in the next section the data generated under mixed systems with various
interactive effects between both ballots.
3.1.2 Linkage under mixed systems
Figure 4 presents distributions of dominated districts’ frequency at different degrees of
interactive effects.
As expected above, the higher degree of interactive effects in expectation formation
operates in favor of dominance by the two largest national-level parties. That is, if
voters utilize more national-level PR results to form expectation, candidates from the
two same parties rank ﬁrst and second across districts.
Each of the further two kinds of interactive effects also has an impact upon the
frequency of dominated districts. The common tendency concerning both kinds of
interactive effects is that the inﬂuence of the plurality tier upon the PR tier leads to a
higher frequency of dominated districts, and vice versa. In terms of interactive effects
in vote decision (l2), this may seem to be in line with Duverger’s conjecture, or the
spill-over effect. He expected to see in mixed systems that the PR vote should be
inﬂuenced by plurality vote, which should result in a national-level bipartism. Note,
however, that Duverger did not account for the linkage process. In contrast, the results
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here demonstrate that interactive effects are causing this ignored element of Duverger’s
Law. Interactive effects concerning perceived ideological position l1 also have the
same kind of impact upon the level of linkage even if it is less clear than that of l2.
Now, we are turning to the effect of further factors summarized in Figure 5. As
discussed earlier, high-level linkage is expected to occur within homogeneous voter
distributions across districts. The upper-left panel supports this expectation. The more
homogeneous voter distributions are, the more likely the districts are dominated by the
largest national-level parties. If one compares with the result under simple plurality
(Figure 3), the frequency of dominated districts at each level of homogeneity is higher
under a mixed system than under plurality. This is due to the existence of interactive
effects, in particular in terms of expectation formation.
The number of parties also has an expected effect. That is, the more parties that are
in competition, the less frequent dominated districts are. The degree is higher than that
under simple plurality (Figure 3). Similar to the homogeneity, interactive effects under
mixed systems operate in favor of a higher level of linkage.
Observation of the inﬂuence of a number of individual strategies upon the level
of linkage provides similar results which have been observed under simple plurality
(Figure 3). However, the variance of the linkage level is greater here for each number
of strategies. This means that its effect is less clear under mixed systems than under
simple plurality. The added variances are attributed to the introduction of interactive
effects under mixed systems. As observed above, interactive effects also have non-
trivial impacts upon the linkage level, which made the effect of further factors — here
the number of individual strategies — less clear.
A reversed result can be observed in the effect of the use of expected utility in
vote decision. According to the down-right panel of Figure 5, the use of expected
utility has a certain impact in favor of high-level linkage. It has, in contrast, no impact
under plurality (Figure 3). The elements are integrated only in the simulation under
mixed systems, i.e., interactive effects play an intervening role and make the difference
between simulations with and without the use of expected utility.


























































































































Figure 5. Frequency of dominated districts at different degrees of further factors under mixed
systems
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3.2 Multivariate analysis of the linkage process
In the last section, we predominantly observed bivariate relationships between fre-
quency of dominated districts and various factors. As I mentioned in some places
above, however, different levels of linkage are the products of certain interactions be-
tween diverse factors. I move, therefore, to multivariate analysis to observe the net
impact of each factor.
In the following analysis, statistical estimations are conducted via a maximum like-
lihood approach since simulated data can be assumed to stem from repeatable obser-
vations of an identical data generating process. Furthermore, the simulated data are
suited for the multivariate analysis since parameters are generated randomly and, thus,
independent of each other. Consequently, there is no risk of multicolinearity among
independent variables. Note that the amount of observations analyzed here is quite
extensive. As noted above, 1,000 simulation runs with randomly generated parameters
for each were repeated. For each run, 40 cycles were collected so that we have in total
40,000 cycles. Furthermore, the unit of observation is not a single cycle, but each 30
districts in each cycle. Therefore, we have a total of 1,200,000 observations in data
sets. Since this extensive number of observations makes estimated standard errors (SE
in tables) quite small, I have to note that the stated SE in following results are less
conclusive. Therefore, I will concentrate on the interpretation of estimated coefﬁcients
and, needless to say, mention their signiﬁcance tests.
To observe which factor determines the level of linkage, the following model is
estimated.
drck = Bern(pr) (25)
logit(pr) = bXr,
where drck is the dominance of district k at c-th cycle in r-th simulation run. It is coded
one if the district is competed among candidates of two largest parties at the national
level, and otherwise zero. Xr is the vector of parameters of r-th simulation run.
As discussed above, I expect that the increasing use of national-level PR tier results
in expectation formation (higher l3 parameter) boosts the level of linkage. Also, the
absence of the PR tier’s inﬂuence in terms of preference formation (l1 ≤0) is expected
to contribute indirectly to higher-level linkage since each candidate can better adapt to
each district speciﬁc voter distribution. In contrast, I have no expectation concern-
ing interactive effects in vote decision l1. In addition to interactive effects between
both tiers, I also expect that heterogeneity of voter distributions across districts and
the number of each candidate/party strategies affect the level of linkage. High-level
heterogeneity of voter distributions is expected to lead to a higher level of linkage. If
preference proﬁles of each district are more similar to each other, it is more likely that
candidates from the same set of two parties compete in every district. For each can-
didate strategy, one can expect that the increasing number would reduce the level of
linkage.
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Table 1. Estimation results of the logit model (dependent variable: dominance of districts)
Model 1 Model 2
Coefﬁcient S.E. Coefﬁcient S.E.
Intercept −1.0227 0.0083 −1.0486 0.0083
Interactive effects in terms of
Perceived Position (l1) −0.4817 0.0030 −0.1908 0.0046
Vote Decision (l2) −0.2517 0.0031 −0.1128 0.0046
Expectation (l3) −0.8976 0.0057 −0.8726 0.0058
l1×l3 −0.6961 0.0083
l2×l3 −0.3638 0.0084
Actualization of expectation −0.2361 0.0061 −0.2185 0.0061
Homogeneity −0.2078 0.0014 −0.2128 0.0014
No. Hunters −0.2500 0.0020 −0.2469 0.0020
No. Predators −0.4380 0.0020 −0.4460 0.0020
No. Aggregators −0.2971 0.0021 −0.3017 0.0021
No. Stickers −0.1815 0.0019 −0.1810 0.0020
Note: N = 1,200,000.
Estimation results of Model 1 in Table 1 show, as expected, that interactive effects
between two ballots facilitate linkage of district races. Increasing interactive effects
in the expected direction between two ballots causes higher-level linkage. While I
expected in l3 the most direct effect, the other two kind of interactive effects also
seem to affect the level of linkage to a high extent. These effects are, however, highly
intermediated by l3. If one adds to the model interaction effects of l1×l3 and l1×l2
(Model 2), the coefﬁcients of the main effect of l1 and l2 were estimated as being
much smaller. That is, these parameters boost the linkage level to a much lesser extent
without l3. Furthermore, the interaction effects are even larger than the main effects of
l1 andl2 estimatedinModel1. Bycontrast, themainestimatedeffectofl3 remainson
the same level of Model 1. These results support that interactive effects in expectation
formation are the most direct and important factor for linkage among various kinds of
interactive effects between two ballots.
Turning to the other factors, homogeneity of districts regarding distribution of
voter’s ideal points catapults the linkage process. The estimated coefﬁcient is smaller
than those for interactive effects between two ballots. However, the parameter for the
homogeneity has a larger range between −2 and 2 than other parameters. Therefore,
the effect of homogeneity upon the linkage level should be interpreted correspond-
ingly. Figure 6 clariﬁes the effect of homogeneity and interactive effects in expectation
formation. The two lines show forecasted linkage levels as dependent on the level of
l3 according to Model 1 in Table 1. For the above line, the homogeneity parameter
h was set to 2 and for the below line h = −2. The difference at the two lines’ level
clearly demonstrates that homogeneity is a quite important factor for linkage of district
races. While h was bounded between −2 and 2 in the simulation runs, one can extend
the range of this parameter. Therefore, one can even expect a higher linkage level for
a higher h value and vice versa. This may appear to support the notion of political
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Figure 6. Forecasted percentages of dominated districts based on the simulation results
sociologists, i.e. the large impact that social contexts of political competition have on
the party system. However, a more precise notion based on the results here would be
to use the term “a large impact” instead of “the large impact”. For interactive effects
between two ballots in forming expectation and vote decision also boost the percent-
age of dominated districts. For a certain high level of homogeneity (h = 2), the levels
of linkage yielded with the full use of the PR tier information in expectation forma-
tion (l3 = 1) and without it make up a 17%-points difference. This seems to explain
why West Germany, New Zealand and Japan demonstrate increases of the linkage level
in such short time periods. In contrast, it is less conceivable that for such short time
spans those voter distributions across districts became so homogeneous that high-level
linkage could be established.
Concerning the number of candidate strategies, an increase in number generally
lowers the percentage of dominated districts. The extent is, however, different among
candidate/party strategies. The increasing number of Predators shows the strongest
tendency toward the absence of linkage and the number of Stickers has the least effect
onthelinkagelevel. Theseareconsistentwiththeresultsinthebivariateanalysisabove
(Figure 5). Note also here that the effect of the number of strategies can be larger, as
was the case with the homogeneity parameter, since that parameter has a larger range
of values. This, however, does not mean that the number of strategies is the dominant
factor for linkage but one of them, including interactive effects and homogeneity.
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4. Discussion
Beginning with an empirical puzzle concerning the West German party system, this pa-
per proposed an interactive mechanism model of mixed-member systems which opera-
tes in favor of high-level linkage. The results of the computational model demonstrated
that mixed systems have independent effects of further competing factors for high-level
linkage, like social homogeneity and party competition.
One might ask whether mixed systems in the other countries also operate in a si-
milar way to that of West Germany. At present, there are three political systems in
the world which have experienced mixed systems at least for 10 years: New Zealand,
Japan and East Germany. Among them, New Zealand and Japan show a rapid increase
of the linkage level after the introduction of their mixed systems. Social homogene-
ity is less conceivable as an explaining factor for such a rapid change of the linkage
level. Party competition in both countries has been relatively stable as well. Therefore,
the interactive mechanism suggested in this paper seems to be most appropriate one to
explain the short-termed linkage trend.
In contrast to New Zealand and Japan, East Germany shows no increasing level of
linkage. Also here, we should not attribute it to social homogeneity or party competi-
tion due to its short termed change, in particular between the 2002 and 2005 election.
One possible hypothesis based on this paper’s model would be that East Germany has
some special conditions which disrupt interactive effects in expectation formation un-
der mixed systems. One such possible condition could be the deviating developments
of East German state-level parliaments where the ex-communist PDS occasionally be-
comes the second-largest party. At the time of the 2005 federal election, this was the
case in four of six East German state parliaments.
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